It is traditionally argued that the enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPRs) is necessary to compensate innovators for incurring the fixed costs of research and development (R&D). The argument in support of finite domestic patent protection is familiar. On one hand, patents provide monopoly rights to innovators as an incentive to innovate. On the other hand, once the innovation has occurred it is socially optimal (in a one-time game) for the government to revoke patent protection so as to lower the price of the invention and increase its use. In a repeated game, however, such a policy would severely dampen future innovations. Hence, the government legally maintains monopoly rights for innovators, but only for a finite time. A similar trade-off exists between developed countries, where a majority of innovations occur, and developing countries that wish to have greater access to these innovations through lower prices. It is commonly assumed that developed countries will always find it optimal to have full international IPRs and that developing countries will always find it optimal to have no IPR enforcement. Recent work by Gene Grossman and Edwin Lai (2004) considers a NorthSouth environment where both countries have innovating firms, although the North has a greater capacity for innovation. They consider globally efficient regimes of patent protection within a variety-expanding model. In that environment, among policy combinations that give the same overall incentives for global innovation, the stronger the patent protection in the South, the greater the gain for the North at the expense of the South.
Here we introduce IPRs into a North-South model of technological diffusion through trade and imitation. The model explicitly considers positive spillovers from innovation in the North to imitative research in the South through exposure to trade. These spillovers, in combination with feedback effects between innovating Northern and imitating Southern firms, implies that welfare in both regions depends on how IPRs affect world growth. Rather than finding that increasing IPR protection in the South always increases Northern welfare at the expense of the South, we find that properly designed Southern IPRs are welfare enhancing for both regions, especially during Southern trade liberalization. Similarly, poorly designed IPRs are welfare decreasing for both regions. Our results do not necessarily imply that both regions' welfare will be maximized by exactly the same level of IPR protection. But it does mean that IPRs don't always favor developed nations at the expense of developing nations. However, Northern sales in the South can be wiped out by future Northern innovation or by Southern imitation. Consider two possible IPR regimes in the South. In the first regime, a Southern firm must compensate, through a licensing fee, the Northern firm it has imitated to be allowed to sell domestically. Without IPR enforcement, that transfer is zero. As IPR enforcement rises, so does the licensing payment. In the second regime, in a similar vein as Elhanan Helpman (1993) , IPR enforcement affects the ability to sell an imitated good;
i.e. a Southern imitator will be able to sell with probability p C (1 − p IP R ), where p C is the probability of imitation (copying) and p IP R is the probability of IPR enforcement. 
C i is a Cobb-Douglas aggregator of domestic and imported final goods. We assume that both countries spend equal proportions on each type of final good. The change in domestic assets is given by the difference in labor and interest income minus final consumption expenditures.
Household demand for each good depends only on its relative price and expenditure levels.
Optimal control techniques yield consumption growth, improvements. We set the size of this step to be a constant, q, greater than 1. The rung at which the good is located on the ladder is denoted by k. Normalizing so all goods begin at quality level 1, the quality of an intermediate good in sector j will rise from 1 to q with the first innovation, to q 2 with the second innovation, and to q k j with the k j th innovation.
Since technology is embodied in intermediate goods, output growth in each country is driven by technological advances in the quality of domestically available inputs, regardless of country of origin. Aggregate final goods production is undertaken by many perfectly competitive firms in the North (N ) and the South (S):
A is a productivity parameter dependent upon domestic institutions. L is the labor input used in final goods production, and q k N jx ik j is the quality-adjusted level of intermediate The lead innovating firm in each sector uses limit pricing to wipe out sales of lower quality goods. Innovations are drastic; for given Southern tariffs on intermediates, τ x S , and M C S , the size of quality improvements is large enough for a Northern firm to hold the world market with a single quality level improvement over a Southern copy (i.e.
With monopolistic competition in the intermediate sector, expected profits depend on the closest competition faced by the firm. In the North, full IPR enforcement guarantees that Northern innovators always face the previous Northern innovator as their closest competitor.
Assuming q(1 − α) ≤ 1, they will choose a limit price slightly below qM C N = q. Since the latest innovation is q times more productive than its predecessor and since M C N = 1, q is the lowest price at which the previous innovator could sell without earning negative profits.
This limit price will wipe out Northern sales of all older technologies.
In the Southern market there are three types of firms: Northern exporting firms facing Northern competition, n * N N , Northern exporting firms facing Southern competition, n * N S , and Southern imitating firms facing Northern competition, n S . Since there are J sectors, J = n S + n * N S + n * N N . They will respectively have limit prices: P * N N = q(1 + τ x S + t), P * N S = qM C S , and P S = 1 + τ x S + t.
In either country i, for a given limit price, P x ij , and final goods price, P i , implied demand for intermediate goods in sector j is
Firms choose the resources to devote to research based on the expected present value of profits for successful research, which depends on the probabilities of innovation and imitation. Within an intermediate goods sector j, presently at quality level k N j , p Ik N j is the probability per unit of time that the next innovation occurs. p Ik N j follows a Poisson process, which depends positively on resources devoted to research, z Ik N j , and past industry specific domestic learning-to-learn, ϑ k N j , and negatively on the complexity, ϕ Ik N j , of the good upon which firms are attempting to improve:
β I reflects a positive spillover from past experience, while ζ I is a fixed cost of innovative research. The probability, p Ck N j , of imitating the current technology, k N j , is
Learning in the South depends on the highest sector-specific experience gained through imitation. The spillover from innovative experience, β I , is greater than that from imitation, and Z C , respectively) will exactly equal the expected present discounted value of profits.
Entry and exit into n S , n * N S , and n * N N depend on p IP R and the average p C and p I :
Note that in our first IPR scenario, p IP R = 0.
Finally, there are two world resource constraints
where Z i represents aggregate research costs and X represents intermediate goods in different categories.
Solutions are found using the free entry conditions, sector category expressions, two world resource constraints, a balanced trade condition, two consumer demand conditions, two consumption growth conditions, and the functional forms for p I and p C .
Results
First consider trade liberalization in the South, independently of any Southern IPRs. Lowering Southern tariffs causes a large initial increase in imitation, which then falls in transition but remains above its previous steady-state level. Innovation drops slightly on impact, but then rises gradually until it reaches a new higher steady-state level equal to that of imitation.
This leads to higher world growth. In steady-state, this is welfare-enhancing for both coun- In the second IPR regime, the Southern government raises p IP R at the same time as it lowers tariffs. In this case, Northern firms effectively face less competition from Southern imitators, causing them to slow their rate of innovation. Hence, imposing IPRs that limit competition from the South end up being welfare reducing for both regions.
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Comparing these two IPR regimes in the context of trade liberalization for a developing region highlights four important points. First, the welfare implications for IPR strengthening in developing countries differ greatly depending on the design of the IPR regime. Second, the optimal IPR regime depends on whether or not technological diffusion is occurring and whether or not there are feedback effects between innovating firms and imitating firms.
Third, it is important to consider not only steady-state results, but also the transition paths when determining welfare effects. Finally, the presence of feedback effects suggests that, unlike most previous findings, there may not be a direct conflict on optimal IPR design from the perspective of developed and developing nations. Namely, in a model of technological diffusion, both regions ultimately care about the same world growth rate. Hence, IPR policies that maximize this world growth rate will be in the interest of both regions.
